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This paper presents a stylized economy with a labor market characterized by search 
friction. Endogenous technological progress is the only source of growth. A single good 
is produced with the only factor of production, labor. It works as input in both production 
and R&D. The model derives the optimal job match that leads towards maximum long 
run gain, and this optimal can be achieved even without changing the economy’s growth 
rate. Model proposes, higher payment in R&D is optimal for high growing countries 
and/or countries with high labor market efficiency. The results are robust with tax-
financing government expenditure and under stochastic fluctuations. 
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1. Introduction 
“Signs America’s Scientific Edge Is Slipping”2 
---Farrel (Denver Post, 2006) 
 
The above headline aptly captures the central concern of the present paper. A class of empirical 
literature suggests college enrollment decisions are a countercyclical phenomenon (Dellas and 
Sakellaris (2003)). It is estimated (Long (2004)) that college enrollment rates often increase as the 
unemployment rate grows. Such a trend is evident for both boys and girls (Clark (2011)). Even in 
the course of the recent recession (during 2010), college applications have increased significantly 
both in the USA and UK (Bell and Blanchflower (2011), Long (2013)). We need to posit a suitable 
theoretical framework, to account for these findings and the headline mentioned at the beginning. 
This paper builds a model that determines an optimal level of labor market friction such that the 
countercyclical nature of college enrollment, in turn, can create desired technological 
advancement. The major contribution of the paper is in its central argument: the labor market 
imperfection itself can be used to counter an already existent distortion to achieve optimality. 
The existing discourse (started from Diamond (1965), Yaari (1965), Blanchard (1985)) shows that 
the short lived individuals bring an inefficiency in the system by not including ‘the future’ of the 
economy in their optimization exercise. Economists have discussed the relationship between R&D 
and the long run objective of the economy for quite a long time3. However, the discussion about 
the emergence of inefficiency in the allocation of resources in the R&D sector due to the finitely 
lived individuals is much thinner in the endogenous growth literature. In this context, this paper 
suggests that the optimal level of labor market friction helps the economy to achieve its long run 
goal. To restore efficient allocation in the model with finitely lived individuals, this paper neither 
depends on altruism (like Barro (1974) type growth models) nor it includes money (like, 
Samuelson (1958) type models).  
This stylized model closely builds on a Pissarides type (Pissarides (2000)) search-matching 
framework of labor market imperfection. However, here, the implications of the labor market 
friction are somewhat different. The unmatched part of the workforce is considered as a reserved 
                                                          
2 Commentaries and accounts, both in the popular press and in serious academic discussions, have come up with the 
opinion that steadily USA is losing its comparative advantage in advanced research (Business Roundtable (2005), 
Galama and Hosek (2008) etc). 
3 See Romer (1986, 1994), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Howitt and Aghion (1998), etc.  
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labor endowment. Labor market frictions induce some of the workers to work in the R&D sector 
at a lower wage (Lassibille (2001), Marey (2002), Dupuy and Smits (2010)) and this, in turn, 
improves the future technological progress of the economy4. Hence, in this set up, labor market 
friction has a dual role. On the one hand, it restricts matching between workers and firms and 
promotes inefficiency. On the other hand, it encourages agents to join the R&D sector which in 
turn enhances the development of future technology. These two effects taken together give rise to 
the possibility of interior optimality. The role of the government is crucial in this model. Factor 
payment in R&D, i.e. R&D wage rate, is dependent on both the production sector wage and 
government’s policy. The key idea of this set up is, once government alters the policy for R&D 
sector wage payment, effectively it manipulates the wage in the production sector because the 
labor market in production sector is constituted of search and matching friction where wage is 
determined through Nash Bargaining. Again, the R&D sector wage is also affected by private 
sector wage rate. This loop can bring efficiency in the model through counter distortion if 
government judiciously sets its policy towards R&D expenditure. The paper derives the 
‘optimum’, find the suitable policy which leads the economy to that optimum and finally, discusses 
the robustness of the analysis under balance budget of the government and stochastic fluctuations 
in production. 
In the long run the hypothetical economy achieves a constant growth rate. Moreover, growth rate 
of this hypothetical economy remains insulated from the labor market outcomes and depends on 
the marginal rate of technology upgrading due to investment in research activities. Hence, the 
optimal labor market outcome does not perturb the growth rate of the economy. Interestingly, 
optimal policy results show that the economies with higher growth rate need to pay higher wages 
to the R&D sector workers. Same is the case for the countries where the labor market is more 
efficient. These findings hint towards the possibilities of over investment in the wage payment of 
R&D sectors in the less growing or less developed (defined as higher level of labor market friction) 
countries, by imitating more developed economies (see, McGuinness (2006)). 
                                                          
4 At this point, the author clarifies that the model is not aiming to introduce friction in the labor market from the lack 
of it, but the focus is to find the optimal level of friction while knowing the fact that the labor market is frictional in 
most of the countries. Policy directive is to keep the friction at the optimum level, and not to introduce friction afresh.  
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Interestingly, all the major results remain unaltered, if the model is extended by inclusion of a 
binding budget constraint for the government, or by allowing random fluctuation in the production 
process of the firm.  
Few articles in the literature of trade union show that, in the presence of unionization, 
unemployment can cause a positive effect to generate R&D. Hence, government may strengthen 
the power of the labor union in the production sector, such that R&D sector grows, which in turn 
boosts the long run growth rate of the economy (Palokangas (2004), Lingens (2005)). However, 
there is a quite a large literature about growth and labor market friction. Most prominent 
contributions among many are Aghion and Howitt (1994), Mortensen and Pissarides (1998), King 
and Welling (1995), Meckl (2004) etc. All of the articles are thematically different from this 
present paper, and none of them tries to capture labor market as a tool of counter distortion to 
achieve optimality.  
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section explains the assumptions and the modeling 
details of this paper. Determination of the equilibrium values of all endogenous variables is 
obtained in Section 3. Section 4 finds the long run optimal path for the economy and suggests 
appropriate policy to achieve that path. Section 5 discusses the two extensions of the basic model. 
The first checks the robustness of the model under the balanced budget constraint for the 
government. The second shows the robustness of the results under stochastic fluctuations. The last 
section, namely section 6, summarizes the whole model and draws some concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Basic Model 
In this section, we build our benchmark model. The following sub-sections describe the details of 
this basic model, which is embedded in a discrete time framework.  
 
2.1. Basic Structure and Time Sequence 
The hypothetical economy comprises of individuals who live for two periods, infinitely lived firms 
and a benevolent government. Individuals are endowed with two unit of labor from which each 
unit can be supplied in each period inelastically. They receive utility from consumption at the end 
of their life span. Firms employ labor, as the only factor input, to produce a single good which is 
consumed by the agents of the economy. Product markets are perfectly competitive. However, the 
labor market consists of search and matching friction (see, Pissarides, 2000). Government provides 
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an education system and carries R&D activity by educated work-force (which is produced by the 
education system) to improve the available technology of production in the economy5.  
Population mass of each generation is normalized to unity. Two generations are present in the 
economy at any particular time period: young and old. In the beginning, young individuals have 
two options: either they can search for jobs or they can take education, provided by the 
government. Individuals who decide to search for job, create a pool of job seeking workers. At the 
beginning of each period, vacant firms search for productive workers to undertake production. The 
pool of job seeking workers and the vacant firms interact through a Pissarides type random 
matching function. Vacant firms who get matched with the job seekers can commence production. 
Other vacant firms (who have failed to find workers) remain idle until the next matching process 
takes place. Firms employ worker for consecutive two time periods and one worker-firm match 
sustains until the worker is alive. This can also be interpreted as job firing rate is equal to one after 
two periods and within the two periods the firing rate is zero. 
 Government does R&D activity only with the help of educated workers. Therefore, individuals 
who have taken education during the first period can join R&D activity in the second period 
frictionlessly6 and receives wage for one period. Technology available for production at any 
particular period t is developed as an end product of (t − 1)th period’s R&D activity. The workers 
who develop that new technology joined the economy and received their education at (t − 2)th 
period.  
 
2.2. Technological progress 
Technology grows endogenously in this model. The progress of technology depends on the labor 
endowment allotted to the research activity. The gain from investing in research activity increases 
over time at an increasing rate. Available technology at period t is denoted as At. Dynamics of 
technological progress is as follows: exposition  
At+n+1 = At+n + ψ
t+nΩt+n.                                                                                                         (1) 
                                                          
5 Literature burdens with the conflicting views about the effectiveness of public funding versus private funding 
towards enhancing overall productivity of the economy (See, David, Hall and Toole (2000), Hall and Reenen (2000), 
Feldman and Lichtenberg (1998) etc). We are taking the side of public expenditure of R&D since here we are interested 
in the overall technological improvement of the economy. There are countries where still public funding is higher than 
private funding in research (See Albuquerque (2011)). 
6 The extension of this baseline model is elaborated in Appendix 2 where the entry in R&D is also consisted of friction 
and taking education is costly. The main take away of the results are imitating the baseline model’s finding. For more 
clean exposition of the argument, we abstract those two complications in the main text. 
6 
 
where, n is any natural number and ψ > 1. Ω indicates the amount of labor invested towards R&D 
at any period. ψ can be interpreted as the marginal contribution of labor investment towards 
technological change. Here it is assumed that the technology of a particular period depends on the 
previous period’s technology level and the marginal progress of technology is increasing with 
time. 
In this basic structure of the model, it is assumed that mapping between improvement in the 
research activity and increase in the productivity of the worker are non-stochastic. That is, 
improvement in research is certain, and if R&D improves then the increase in productivity of the 
economy is guaranteed in the next period.  
   
2.3. Firms 
Firms, at the beginning of any point in time, can be of two types: filled or vacant. Filled firms pay 
per period wage to the already hired laborers at the beginning of each period. This is the only cost 
for a filled firm. Per period productivity of each worker, employed at t, is At which remains 
unchanged for the two successive time periods. Vacant firms need to incur a positive cost of 
posting a vacancy for hiring a worker. We assume this vacancy posting cost is proportional7 to the 
productivity of a worker at that period. That is, vacancy posting cost at period t is dAt, say. After 
posting the vacancy a vacant firm faces a random matching function to get a worker and undertake 
production. The matching function which is considered here follows the properties of Pissarides 
type matching function which is increasing in its each argument, concave and homogenous of 
degree one. The specific form is assumed as the following (Stevens (2007))8: 
Mt =
γutvt
ut+vt
                                                                                    (2) 
Where 0 < 𝛾 < 1. ut is the number of individuals searching for the job and vt is the number of 
vacancies posted at tth period. 𝛾 can be interpreted as the degree of overall matching efficiency of 
the labor market.  
Probability of a successful matching at period t for a firm is, 
M(θ−1, 1) ≡
Mt
vt
=
γ
1+θt
                (3) 
                                                          
7This assumption is commonly used in the literature. See Pissarides (chapter 1, 2000). 
8 The specific form of matching function is purely for algebraic clarity. Exact results can be obtained even with the 
general form.  
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Where θ(≡
v
u
) is conventionally termed as market tightness.  
Let Vt be the life time expected return from a vacant post from the 𝑡
𝑡ℎ  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 onwards. There are 
two components in Vt: cost of posting a vacancy and expected return from that vacancy.  Since 
firms are infinitely lived Vt can be represented in recursive form.  
Vt = −dAt + M(θt
−1, 1) ((At − wt) +
(At−wt)
1+r
+
Vt+2
(1+𝑟)2
) + (1 − M(θt
−1, 1)) (
Vt+1
1+𝑟
)                       (4) 
𝑟 > 0 is the interest rate, faced by the firm. wt is the per period wage which is determined at the 
beginning of period t and prevails the same contract for the next two periods. The justification 
behind this assumption is, the technical knowhow for each matching taking place at the beginning 
of period t, is At and as we have explained earlier, firms can adopt technology only before 
commencing the production activity.  
Perfectly competitive goods market allows firms to entry and to exist, freely. In equilibrium this 
implies, Vt to be zero, for all t. Thus using equation (4), we get: 
M(θt
−1, 1) =
dAt
2(At−wt)
                 (5) 
 
2.4. Workers 
In this model a representative individual receives utility only from the consumption of the good. 
Further it is assumed that she consumes at the end of her life span. She does not have any bequest 
motive or no credit market exists to smooth the consumption over two periods. Utility depends 
linearly on consumption9. Therefore, only the income which she earns in her whole life time does 
matter in utilitarian terms, and now onwards we use wage earned as an alternative for her utility.   
Individuals, who are born and look for the job at period t, face the same matching function as 
described in equation (2). The probability of getting an employment by one job seeker is, hence, 
the following: 
M(1, θ) ≡
Mt
ut
=
γ
θt
−1+1
.                                                                                                                   (6) 
                                                          
9 Introduction of effort cost can also generate similar results to which this model is particularly focusing. 
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A successful matching offers wt as per period wage to the ‘lucky’ searcher. If one fails to get 
employed, as described earlier, she may join the government provided schooling or may remain 
unemployed. In either case, she does not receive any wage at period t. However, if she decides to 
take education (costless, for computational ease) then she has the option to join research activity 
and earn a positive wage, Rt+1 (say), at period (t + 1). It is a simplifying assumption that there 
exists no friction when she joins R&D activity. On the other hand if she remains unemployed, she 
gets nothing. Clearly in this model remaining unemployed is a dominated strategy for any 
individual.10  
 
2.5. Wages 
Costly friction creates the possibility of rent seeking. Firm and worker settle a wage rate through 
Nash bargaining. Hence,  
wt = (2(At − wt))
β
 (2wt − Rt+1)
1−β
wt
arg max
. 
0 < β < 1 be the bargaining power of the firm. First parenthesis contains firm’s share of output. 
Firm’s opportunity cost of not entering into a productive matching is zero (as mentioned earlier, 
Vt = 0 for all t at equilibrium). Whereas worker’s opportunity cost of accepting this match for the 
two consecutive periods is Rt+1, the wage rate for R&D activity at period (t + 1). Thus, worker’s 
output share net from her opportunity cost is comprised in the second parenthesis of the above 
equation. After simplification, 
wt = (1 − β)At +
β
2
Rt+1.                                                                                                             (7) 
Equation 7 shows that the worker’s return from a job match (2wt) is a weighted average of the 
total return from a productive firm-worker matching (2At) and the worker’s return from working 
in R&D sector (Rt+1). That is, 2wt lies in between 2At and Rt+1. In this paper, the determination 
of Rt+1, the Government provided R&D wage rate is not modeled. For any arbitrary Rt+1, it can 
be higher, lower or equal to 2At.  
                                                          
10 The costless education and frictionless R&D sector are not very restrictive assumptions for the 
present purpose. A simple extension of the basic model can imitate similar outcomes. 
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If Rt+1 > 2At, then 2wt > 2At as well (see equation 7). In one hand, all the individual will find it 
optimal to work in R&D and no one will search for job to produce good. Similarly the number of 
vacancy posting will be zero (since return from posting a vacancy will be negative).  
If Rt+1 = 2At, then one can solve the equilibrium number of workers needed for R&D activity to 
get At. However, that does not stop from equilibrium vacancy posting to become zero (see equation 
5). Therefore, production will not take place. 
Rt+1 < 2At (which implies 2wt>Rt+1 and 2At > 2wt too) is the only interesting case. In this case 
equilibrium number of vacancy posting is positive (see equation 5). Here onwards the paper 
focuses only on this case.  
Without loss of generality, following particular Rt+1 (which is less than 2At) is assumed in this 
paper for keeping the model simple and interesting: Government set the wage of the R&D sector, 
Rt+1, as proportional to the expected wage what the agent would get from the firm at period t if 
she gets matched. That is, 
Rt+1 = s2Mtwt                                                                                                                       (8) 
where, 0 < 𝑠 ≤ 1 is the proportionality parameter. As it is discussed in the introduction, often it 
has been seen that the return from working in the R&D sector is lower at a comparable skill level. 
In our model individual who works in the R&D sector, settles late (only for a single period) and 
receives lesser wage too. This makes the framework of the model more close to the real world 
(Lassibille (2001) etc.). 
 
3. Equilibrium 
This section proceeds to solve the model for a unique equilibrium and determines the value of all 
the endogenous variables. 
First we determine the equilibrium wage rate substituting equation (8) into equation (7), 
wt =
1−β
1−𝛽sM(1,θt)
At.                                                                                                                        (9) 
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Therefore, the wage rate depends positively on the policy parameter 𝑠, the technology level of the 
economy and the probability of getting a job, while the bargaining power of the firm affects wage 
rate negatively. 
As we have argued in the previous section, for each individual the return from a job in the 
production sector is strictly higher than the return from R&D sector job. Note that, the person who 
fails to match with the firm, still gets the opportunity to enter into the R&D sector. Therefore, each 
individual chooses to search for the job at the beginning of her life span, as an equilibrium decision. 
Hence, in equilibrium 
ut = 1.             (10) 
and, 
Ωt = 1 − Mt−1.  (Since, from equation (10), M(1, θt) = Mt)                                                    (11) 
From the matching function (equation (2)), assumed in this model, it can be shown that summation 
of the two probability values (i.e. M(1, θt) and M(θt
−1, 1), probability of getting a job and 
probability of getting a worker) is constant and same with the level of overall labor market 
efficiency parameter. However, this functional form is not binding to reach our results. 
Therefore, M(θt
−1, 1)+ M(1, θt) = γ.                                                                                          (12) 
Using equations (5), (10) and (12), therefore, a relation between wage rate and per-period matching 
of the economy can be established, in the following equation: 
Mt = γ −
dAt
2(At−wt)
.                                                                                                                       (13) 
Substituting the value of wt from equation (9) in equation (13) Mtcan be expressed in terms of 
exogenous parameters.  
Mt +
d
2β
1−βsMt
1−sMt
= γ.                                                                                                                     (14) 
Left hand side (LHS) of the equation (14) is a positively sloped monotonic function with respect 
to Mt and right hand side (RHS) is independent of Mt.Therefore in Mt plane, LHS and RHS can 
11 
 
intersect each other for suitable parametric restriction11. Hence, equation (14) solves for the time 
independent equilibrium value of overall employment level of the economy. Henceforth this 
market determined equilibrium value of Mt is denoted as M
∗ (where, 0 < M∗ < 1).This solves all 
the endogenous variables of the model.  
Clearly, technological progress has no impact on M∗, but government spending on research activity 
has a negative influence on it. The intuition is as follows. A higher return from the R&D sector 
increases the outside option of the individual when he bargains with the firm.  If the individual 
gets a higher return from research activity then it increases the outside option for her, when she 
bargains with the firm. This in turn reduces the return of the firm from a productive matching, and 
that implies, Vt becomes negative (recollect equation 4). Vt reaches the break-even point only if v 
falls, and hence, M∗ goes down. Equilibrium level of matching (M∗) also depends on d, β and γ12, 
but here we are focusing on the governments’ policy parameter.  
For the present purpose we rewrite M∗ as: 
M∗ = M∗(s;  d, β, γ).                                                                                                                    (15) 
where, 
∂M∗
∂s
< 0 and M∗(0; d, β, γ) = γ −
d
2β
 (note, we already assumed (𝛾 −
d
2β
) > 0 for the 
existence of the equilibrium). 
 
4. Long Term Gain vis-à-vis Short Term Loss 
In this section we introduce a social planner (government may play this role as well) who is 
concerned about the long run goal.  GDP at a particular time point, t, is strictly increasing with M∗. 
That is, if the labor market friction reaches its minimum then per-period GDP reaches its 
maximum. In this model GDP at period t is the following: 
GDPt = (At + At−1)M
∗.                                                                                                              (16)  
Given all available information, clearly GDPt takes the maximum value for M
∗ = 1.  
                                                          
11 Necessary parametric restriction is d < 2𝛾𝛽.  
12 Effect of other three parameters on M∗  are the following:  
∂M∗
∂d
< 0,  
∂M∗
∂β
> 0 and 
∂M∗
∂γ
> 0. 
12 
 
However, the long run present discounted sum of GDP values from time period t is denoted as Γt 
and is equal to: 
Γt = ∑ δ
nM(At+n−1 + At+n)
∞
n=0 .                                                                                                (17) 
where, the discount rate is δ ∈ (0,1). Incorporating equation (11) we can rewrite equation (1) for 
the time independent M as follows.  
At+n+1 = At+n + ψ
t+n(1 − M).                                                                                                 (18) 
We reduce the equation (17) further by using equation (18) and assuming δψ < 1, as:  
Γt =
M
1−δ
(2At−1 + (1 − M)(1 + δ) (
ψt−1
1−ψδ
)).                                                                            (19) 
As the social planner is concerned about the long run benefit of the economy, the objective of her 
is to maximize equation (19). From tth period onwards, an optimal path for the economy is to be 
chosen by obtaining an appropriate overall matching level of the economy, M∗∗. Therefore to 
maximize Γt, we set 
∂Γt
∂M
= 0 (from equation (19)) and solve for M∗∗13. 
M∗∗ =
1
2
+
At−1
ψt−1
(
1−ψδ
1+δ
).                                                                                                               (20) 
It can also be shown that14 (using equation (18)),  
At
ψt
=
1−M
ψ−1
.                                                                                                                                     (21) 
Suitable substitution of equation (21) into equation (20) solves for M∗∗ which maximizes Γt, and 
represented as the following. The typical expression of this optimal matching level is, 
M∗∗ =
1
2
(1 +
1−ψδ
ψ−δ
) < 1.                                                                                                             (22) 
Therefore, 𝑀∗∗ ∈ (0,1) is the socially optimal level of matching. That is, to achieve the long run 
objective the benevolent social planner needs to choose an optimal policy such that 𝑀∗∗ ∈ (0,1) 
can be achieved. Note that, M∗∗ does not depend on s.Since, it has been shown (in section 3) that 
M∗ is monotonically falling with respect to s and M∗∗ is independent of s, for specific parametric 
                                                          
13 At M∗∗ second order condition is also satisfied 
14 Assumption: if n → ∞, then At−n → 0. 
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restrictions (i.e. if, γ −
d
2β
> 𝑀∗∗), M∗ and M∗∗ cut each other in (M, s) plane. Hence, social planner 
may achieve M∗∗ by suitably choosing s∗ such that, 
M∗∗ = M∗(s∗; d, β, γ)                                                                                                                   (23) 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
4.1.  Growth and Comparative Statics. 
This hypothetical economy grows at a constant rate and equal to, 
g ≡
ΔGDPt+1
GDPt
=
ψ+1
1+
2
1−M
At
ψt
= ψ − 1. (Using equation (21))                                                             (24) 
g does not depend on M either. That is, if the economy moves along the optimal path then also 
growth rate of the economy remains unperturbed. Hence, s∗can be set with a fixed per period 
growth rate. Note that, in this model, like in most of the endogenous growth literature, wage rate 
is growing at the same rate as the economy (see equation 9). 
Turning to the comparative statics exercise, clearly as ψ increases growth rate of the economy 
increases. Interestingly, 
∂M∗∗
∂ψ
<  0 from equation (22). That is, for high growing economy it is 
optimal to allocate more individuals to R&D. Thus, the model says, from figure 1, government of 
high growing economy in the steady state should pay high to the R&D sector workers. 
Again, partial differentiation of equation (14) with respect to 𝛾 around M∗, shows that: 
∂M∗
∂γ
> 0, for 
any value of s. Given all other parameters fixed, if the overall efficiency of the labor market 
increases then market determined equilibrium level of job match also rises. This result combined 
with the figure 1 gives us more insight. Since, for each s, M∗ increases for higher γ, therefore in 
the figure 1, M∗ curve shifts up. That leads to higher s∗. That is, economies with higher level of 
labor market efficiency should pay more to the R&D sector workers than the one with lesser labor 
market efficiency. On the contrary, in the less developed countries where labor market is less 
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efficient, return from R&D needs to be lesser as compared to developed countries (consists of 
higher labor market efficiency).  
These two observations taken tighter brings out an important discussion. By imitating high 
developed countries less developed or less growing economies may end up paying excess money 
to the R&D sector workers. Empirical literature draws attention to the prevalence of investment in 
over-education in several less growing or less developed countries (see, McGuinness 2006).  
Therefore, when the present paper focuses on the issue of the optimal level of labor market friction 
(which also implies the optimal level of payment to the R&D sector workers), then it indicates the 
possibility of over-payment in the R&D sector too.  
 
5. Discussions 
In the previous sections we develop a model with a very simple set up. This section demonstrates 
with two examples that, the simple set up is not very restrictive to our findings. The discussion is 
kept short, because it does not bring any qualitative changes in the results of the model, but, 
nonetheless, demonstrates robustness.   
 
5.1. Government with Budget Constraint 
This section incorporates a budget constraint (henceforth BB) for the government, which has to be 
balanced.  Here, government has the power to freely impose discriminatory tax on the individuals. 
Using that authority, government taxes once on a lump-sum basis, the individuals who get the job 
as a worker of a firm, and thus, finances the cost incurred for R&D activity. This tax rate, τt, is 
known to all at the beginning of any period, t (say). So, workers bargain on their effective wage 
after getting matched with a firm. Therefore, the new wage rate, wt
τ, is:  
wt
τ =   (2(At − wt
τ))
β
 (2wt
τ − τt − Rt+1
τ )1−β
wt
τ
arg max
. 
Equation (8) still holds in this set-up. That is, government pays researcher as a proportion of the 
expected wage what they may get if they would work in a firm. Using that we solve the new, 
wt
τ =
(1−β)At+
𝛽
2
τt
1−βsMt
τ .                                                                                                                         (25) 
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Government in each period spends the entire revenue, earned from taxation, in research activity. 
Hence, the budget balance constraint is the following: 
τMt
τ = (1 − Mt
τ)Rt+1
τ                                                                                                                    (26) 
Substituting equation (8) in equation (26) and then replacing wt
τ from equation (25), equilibrium 
tax rate can be solved: 
τt
∗ =
2s(1−β)
1−sβ
At(1 − Mt
τ).                                                                                                             (27) 
For solving the equilibrium value of market determined overall successful matching we would 
recall equation (13). For the present purpose the equation is rewritten with new notation:  
Mt
τ = γ −
dAt
2(At−wt
τ)
.                                                                                                                      (28) 
It is straight forward to understand, in this version also all individuals first search for a job in a 
firm, and then who ever fails to get employment receives education and joins R&D activity at the 
second period. Therefore, equations (10) and (11) remain unchanged. Now, first substituting 
equation (27) into equation (25) and then, replacing the value of  wt
τ back into equation (28) we 
get the following equation which can solve for the equilibrium 0 < Mτ∗ < 1: 
Mt
τ +
d
2β
[
1−sMt
τ
1−βsMt
τ +
(1−Mt
τ)s(1−β)
(1−sβ)(1−βsM)
]
−1
= γ.                                                                                     (29) 
LHS of the above equation has a positive relation with M𝑡
τ.  Hence, for 
d
2β
(
1−sβ
1−s
) < 𝛾, there exists 
a unique solution for Mτ
∗
. Note that, M∗ < Mτ∗. Moreover, 
∂Mτ∗
∂s
< 0 and Mτ∗(0; d, β, γ) > 0 still 
holds. 
Since, BB policy is a redistributive instrument, GDP value of any period does not change compared 
to the benchmark case (without BB constraint). Hence the optimal Γt
∗(M∗∗) and growth rate of the 
economy remain unchanged. However, to reach that sτ∗ is to be set such that Mτ
∗
= M∗∗, and it is 
not difficult to show that s∗ > 𝑠τ∗. 
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Figure 2 
 
 
5.2. Stochastic Fluctuation in Output 
This section discusses the model further by allowing stochastic fluctuation. This is to check how 
the results vary from the basic model when economy varies from one state to another. Intuitive 
interpretation of this extension says, the effect of research output on the productivity of the firm is 
uncertain. Say, the productivity depends on a random parameter, ϕ. Whatever be the technological 
outcome, the usefulness on the productivity also depends on ϕ too. To make the analysis simple it 
is assumed that ϕ can take only two positive values: ϕ
t
= {ϕ
1
,   ϕ
2
}, and follows a stationary 
Markov process, with the transition matrix Π2×215. To avoid the cumbersome analysis, we once 
again ignore the budget constraint of the government. 
Instead of At, let the productivity from a successful matching at period t is now: 
Ψt = Atϕt.                                                                                                                                   (30) 
Value of ϕ
t
 is known to all only at the beginning of the period t. That is, at the beginning of a time 
period firms and workers both know what is going to be the productivity level of a new matching 
at that period.  
It is straight forward to prove that although wage fluctuates with stochastic shocks equation (14) 
still holds. Thus one can solve for M∗. Therefore, overall per period matching level of the economy 
remains the same and time invariant. This is because, in this hypothetical economy, matched firms 
and workers are absorbing the entire effect of the productivity shock.  
                                                          
15Π = [
π 1 − π
π 1 − π
]. Where, 0 < Πij < 1. Therefore, if at time period t, ϕ takes the value ϕ1 then the probability of 
repeating ϕ1 at period (t+1) is π̅ and the probability of a change to ϕ2 is 1 − π̅. On the other hand, if ϕ is ϕ2 at period 
t, then at period (t+1), ϕ takes the value ϕ1 with the probability π and it remains ϕ2 with the probability 1 − π.  
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Determination of long run optimal is now based on the maximization of the expected time 
discounted long run sum of GDP values. Therefore the objective function for this analysis is, 
EΓt = ∑ pl
∗(Et−1
l Γt)l .                                                                                                                  (32) 
Where, l = {1, 2} and Et−1
l Γt is the long run time discounted sum of expected GDP values given 
the value of ϕ at the period (t-1). Stationary state value of P(ϕ = ϕ
l
) at any period is denoted as 
pl
∗. A typical solution of p1
∗ =
π
π+(1−π)
 and p2 =
1−π
π+(1−π)
.  
Given (ϕ = ϕ
l
), following equation specifies Et−1
l Γt as, , 
Et−1
l Γt = Et−1
l [∑ δnM(Ψt+n−1 + Ψt+n)
∞
n=0 ].                                                      
Kolmogorov-Chapman16 equation helps to reduce the above mentioned infinite sum17 and then by 
maximizing (32) with respect to 𝑀, we obtain: 
 
Mϕ
∗∗ = 1 −
1
2+
1
(1+δ)(ψ−1)
(
pΑ1+qA2
pΒ1+qΒ2
)
.                                                                                                  (33) 
Where, Αl = ϕl + (1 + δ)Π(l; : )(𝐈 − δΠ)
−1[ϕ] and Βl = Π(l; : )(𝐈 − δψΠ)
−1(𝐈 − δΠ)−1[ϕ]. 
Correspondingly, government can solve sϕ
∗∗ such that M∗ = Mϕ
∗∗, (recall, market determined 
equilibrium matching, M∗, is negatively related with s). 
In this version also, expected growth rate does not depend on the overall matching level of the 
economy and ψ has an unambiguously positive impact on growth rate. Hence government can 
choose the optimal path without hampering the growth rate. Expected growth rate is determined 
as, 
Egt = ∑ pl
∗Et−1
l gtl                                                                                (34) 
                                                          
16Kolmogorov-Chapman equation: Π(𝑛+𝑚) = Π(𝑛)Π(𝑚). (𝑛 + 𝑚), (𝑛) and (𝑚) are denoted as steps of transition. 
17Et−1
l Γt = M [At−1[ϕl + (1 + δ)Π(l; : )1×2[𝐈 − δΠ]
−1
2×2
[ϕ]2×1]] + M(1 − M)ψ
t−1(1 + δ)[Π(l; : )1×2[𝐈 −
δψΠ]−1
2×2
[𝐈 − δΠ]−12×2[ϕ]2×1]. 
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where, Et−1
l gt =
Π(l;:)Πϕψ2−ϕl
Π(l;:)ϕψ+ϕl
. 
Note that, expected growth rate increases if ψ increases. That leads to fall in 𝑀𝜙
∗∗ also. Hence, 𝑠𝜙
∗  
increases. 
6. Conclusion  
This model views labor market friction from a very different perspective compared to existing 
literature. After the introduction of search-matching framework, neo-classical general equilibrium 
models got a rigorous micro foundation for an imperfect labor market which enabled them to 
comment on different macroeconomic problems. Most of the contributions in this literature 
showed how positive level of friction in the labor market can drag the economy away from perfect 
competitive solutions. Our model, in contrast, looks for a positive role of labor market friction as 
a counter distortion in a model with endogenous technological progress and two period lived 
individuals. It suggests, instead of reducing friction arbitrarily, economy can gain in long run if 
there exits an appropriate level of positive labor market friction. Economy can achieve that even 
without changing its constant steady state growth rate. The paper proposes, higher payment in R&D 
sector is optimal for high growing countries and/or countries with high labor market efficiency. 
It has been shown that the results are consistent for self-financing government. That is, the main 
results remain unchanged if the government has to maintain a balanced budget. In one other 
extension, we allow random fluctuations in the research output and productivity mapping which 
shifts the productivity of a successful matching from one state to another. It is shown that the 
model is robust to introduction of stochastic fluctuations also.  
 
Appendix 1 
In the sub-section 2.5, we have claimed that the assumption made in equation 8 does not reduce 
the generality of the model. Following argument is made in support of that claim. 
Using equation 7, for any Rt+1, equation 5 can be written as following 
M(θt
−1, 1) =
dAt
2 (βAt −
β
2
Rt+1)
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or, M(θt
−1, 1) =
d
2β(1−
Rt+1
2𝐴𝑡
)
 
Using equation (12) and the above equation, 
Mt = γ −
d
2β (1 −
Rt+1
2At
)
 
As it is argued in sub-section 2.5, 0 <
Rt+1
2𝐴𝑡
< 1 for all t. Note that, 
Rt+1
2𝐴𝑡
 is negatively related to Mt 
and for certain restriction on γ, β and d, 0 < Mt < 1 for all 0 <
Rt+1
2𝐴𝑡
< 1. These two properties of 
the above equation generates most of the important results of the paper. In this paper, 
Rt+1
2At
 has been 
replaced by a specific 0 < st < 1.  To make the model more interesting and to ensure the 
convergence, the assumption in equation 8 is made. 
 
Appendix 2 
Consider the baseline model, but relaxing the assumptions of costless education and frictionless 
R&D sector. To make the model more comprehensive let us introduce a labor-input for providing 
the education. That is, not only to improve the technology level but also to develop educated labor 
force economy needs educated laborers (namely, ‘teachers’). Therefore, the changed set up is the 
following. Agents who take education at period t, have to pay ηt. R&D sector hires 𝜆 proportion 
of the educated labor force. Rests are hired to provide education to the next generation (here, one 
can introduce some friction and generate an educated unemployed labor pull. That will introduce 
only another parameter but otherwise analysis will be the same).  Both types of educated workers 
are receiving wage for only one period (i.e., for t+1th period) and the wages are denoted as Rt+1 
and Zt+1, respectively. Budget balancedness for R&D sector has already been discussed above. 
Here, the discussion focuses on the additional cost that has to be incurred by the Government by 
paying the wage to the ‘teachers’. To finance that budget, it is assumed that the revenue generated 
from the agents who pay the cost for the education, is distributed to the “teachers”. Either the cost 
(ηt) or the wage payment of the ‘teachers’ (Zt) can be considered as given. Here, the Zt is 
considered as exogenously given, and is set similarly as Rt+1. Since all the other mechanisms of 
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the model are exactly the same, here we avoid the repetition of argument that has been made about 
the assumption of Rt+1, and hence of Zt+1.  
In this set up the key equations which come up along with all major equations of Section 2, are the 
following. 
 Bargaining wage equation: wt = (1 − β)At +
β
2
(λRt+1 + (1 − λ)Zt+1 − ηt).       (43) 
Second parenthesis involves the net expected opportunity cost for the laborer to join the production 
sector. 
Budget equation for ‘teachers’: Ntηt = (1 − λ)Nt−1Zt.                                                            (44) 
Where, Nt denotes the number of agents willing to take education at period t. Note that ‘teachers’ 
who receive wage at period t have taken education at period (t − 1) and become ‘teacher’ with 
probability (1 − λ) at period t. Therefore, the right hand side of equation (44) represents the cost 
for paying teachers and the left hand side is the revenue from the agents who are willing to take 
education at period t.  
Using similar argument as stated in baseline model, in equilibrium,18 
 Nt = 1 − Mt.                                                                                  (45) 
Let us assume, similar to Rt+1 in equation (8), Zt+1 = s
′Mtwt.                                                 (46) 
Where, 0 < s′ < 1. 
Rearranging equation (5) and using equation (10) and (12): Mt = γ −
d
2(1−wt/At)
.                    (47) 
From equation (43), 
wt
At
 can be expressed in terms of {
wt−1
At−1
, wt−1, Mt, Mt−1, t} using equations (1), 
(8), (10), (45) and (46). Specifically the equation is the following, 
wt
At
(1 −
β
2
(λs + (1 − λ)s′)Mt) = (1 − β) −
β
2
(1 − λ) (
1−Mt−1
1−Mt
 ) s′Mt−1 (
1
At−1
wt−1
+ψt−1∗
1−Mt−1
wt−1
).  (48) 
                                                          
18 Note that, since the cost associated with getting education makes R&D ever less lucrative.  
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Note that, equation (47) says, Mt is a function of 
wt
At
 only. Therefore, equation (48) returns 
wt
At
 as a 
function of 
wt−1
At−1
 , wt−1 and t.  
To solve the steady state, first we define, there exists a steady state and then we check the 
consistency.  
Say, at the steady state, 
wt
At
= ω,                                                                                                  (49) 
and hence, Mt = M(ω) = γ −
d
2(1−ω)
.                                                                                         (50) 
Therefore, equation (48) becomes, 
ω (1 −
β
2
(λs + (1 − λ)s′)M) = (1 − β) −
β
2
(1 − λ)s′M (
1
1
ω
+ψt−1
1−M
wt−1
).                                     (51) 
Now, one can solve for wt−1 and divide that by At−1. Using similar condition as of equation (21)
19 
following can be obtained, 
ω2 (1 −
β
2
λsM) − ω (1 − β −
(ψ−1)
λ
(1 −
β
2
(λs + (1 − λ)s′)M)) −
(ψ−1)(1−β)
λ
=0.                     (52) 
It is clear that RHS of equation (52) is a third order polynomial (using the value of M(ω) from 
equation (50)) of ω. Therefore, there exists at least one real root of ω and parametric specification 
guarantees its value to be positive. Using the value of ω, steady state M can be solved too. 
Thus, M∗ = M(s, s′).                                                                                                                   (53) 
Rest of the analysis is similar to the basic model described in section 4 and the main results hold. 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 Now 
ψt
At
=
ψ−1
λ(1−M)
. 
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